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ABSTRACT. Today, sustainable relations with a broad
range of key stakeholders are not only important from a
normative business ethics perspective, but also from an
entrepreneurial viewpoint to allow and support the long-
term survival of a firm. We will argue that the traditional
conception of a firm’s corporate social responsibility does
not reflect this view and that a comprehensive and
dynamic conception of a firm’s responsibilities is necessary
to map the reality of business practice and to manage the
challenges implied by sustainability. We think that
distributive justice, that is the way in which firms involve
their stakeholders in their wealth creation and dissemina-
tion processes, provides a comprehensive understanding of
corporate responsibilities. Concerning procedural justice,
we will discuss how firms involve stakeholders in their
strategic processes according to their contribution to
wealth creation. In the course of the article, we will
propose a framework along with three design principles
that can be used for shaping dynamic and comprehensive
corporate responsibilities, and which thereby allow a
sustainable procedure for changing business and non-
business environments.
KEY WORDS: corporate stakeholder responsibility,
CSR, distributive justice, procedural justice, stakeholder
view, wealth creation
Introduction and goals
Since the 1990s, the importance of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) in both the academic and the
business world has grown significantly as several
numbers illustrate. A recent Google search for the
keyword ‘‘corporate social responsibility’’ retrieved
more than 3,750,000 sites, Amazon.com lists almost
7,000 books on the subject, and according to Vogel
(2005) more than 2,000 firms worldwide now issue
reports on their CSR practices. Or as the magazine
Economist already put it in 2004: ‘‘CSR is thriving.
It is now an industry in itself, with full-time staff,
websites, newsletters, professional associations and
massed armies of consultants’’ (2004, p. 53). In a
keynote speech during the 2004 annual colloquium
of the European Academy of Business in Society
(EABIS), R. Edward Freeman addressed and criti-
cized the popular CSR concept (e.g., Carroll, 1991).
Therein his arguments were closely related to the
separation thesis. Freeman (1994) formulated this
hypothesis in response to Friedman’s (1970)
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argument that the discourse of business and the
discourse of ethics can be separated so that business
decisions have no moral content and moral decisions
have no business content. However, Freeman re-
jected this thesis in several articles (e.g., Freeman,
1994; Freeman et al., 2004; Werhane and Freeman,
1999). In his speech at the EABIS colloquium in
2004, he raised three main arguments:
First, the CSR concept provides no natural and
distinguishable responsibility categories to effectively
classify corporate behavior. This refers to the fact
that many corporate decisions may fall into more
than one responsibility category. Freeman (2004,
p. 1) describes this with the example of how difficult
it is to relate a simple business decision such as hiring
new personnel to either economic or ethical (or
social) responsibilities. Second, he points out that
there is a risk that CSR is being treated as a moral
substitute to compensate for harmful (irresponsible)
activities. Third and most importantly, he sees CSR
as contributing to some tendencies in our society to
separate ethics from business and vice versa. Con-
sequently, Freeman (2004, p. 3) comes to the con-
clusion that it is more useful to ask ‘‘how does a firm
treat its stakeholders?’’ instead of asking if the firm is
socially responsible.
In this article, our goal is to contribute to a pos-
sible answer to Freeman’s question of how to treat
corporate stakeholders in a responsible or, in other
words, sustainable manner. In order to do so, we
will develop three design principles that can be used
for taking a comprehensive corporate stakeholder
responsibility perspective. Consequently, we will
focus on the concept of corporate stakeholder respon-
sibility and not on responsibilities that stakeholders
owe to the firm (e.g., Beaulieu and Pasquero,
2002; Windsor, 2002) or on what Dentchev and
Heene (2004) call stakeholder responsibilities
for sustainability that include not only corporate
responsibilities but also those of customers, scien-
tists, information intermediaries, and public policy
makers.
Apart from the introduction, the article is divided
into four sections. In the next section ‘‘From CSR
toward corporate stakeholder responsibility’’, we
will expand on Freeman’s (2004) critique to explain
why we think that CSR has outlived its usefulness,
and why we think that it is more fruitful to look at
corporate stakeholder responsibilities from a wealth
creation and wealth dissemination perspective.
Following this line of argument, we will intro-
duce the stakeholder view framework (e.g., Mat-
tingly, 2004b; Post et al., 2002; Sachs and Ru¨hli,
2004; Walsh, 2005) in the article’s third section. We
will use this framework because of its comprehensive
logic. It combines the resource-based and the
industry-structure view of strategic management
with a socio-political perspective and thereby con-
tributes to a comprehensive view on a firm’s wealth
creation and dissemination process that also enables a
definition of comprehensive corporate responsibility
that is compatible with the concept of sustainability.
We will argue that considering stakeholders as those
individuals and groups that contribute to the firm’s
wealth-creation process (see Post et al., 2002) can
serve as a useful foundation for thinking about cor-
porate responsibilities.
In the fourth part, we will offer what we think are
three basic principles for designing corporate stake-
holder responsibilities from a wealth-creation per-
spective. These principles – which are derived from
the stakeholder view framework – are stakeholder
specificity, the principle of fair wealth distribution, and
time and situation specificity.
In the fifth and last part of the article, we will
discuss in more detail the proposed principles and
our conceptualization of corporate stakeholder
responsibility by drawing some implications. Finally,
we will conclude by depicting some avenues for
future research.
From CSR toward corporate stakeholder
responsibility
In the past, the CSR approach was useful to pro-
mote responsibilities other than purely economic
ones by emphasizing that there may be also some
form of ethical or social responsibilities. Further-
more, interesting insights can be gained by analyzing
– from different perspectives – what firms should
(morally) be responsible for. These perspectives
translate into the four responsibility categories of
Carroll’s (1991) CSR pyramid, namely economic
responsibility, legal responsibility, ethical responsi-
bility, and philanthropic responsibility. This thinking
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in rather abstract responsibility categories is only
partially suited to understand real-world situations
for three main reasons:
First, the categories suggested by the CSR con-
cept are not distinguishable as most decisions of
businesses are not purely economic, legal, ethical, or
philanthropic. For example, Wood (1991) criticized
Carroll’s (1991) approach of steps and phases of
responsibility as she regards the responsibilities
defined by Carroll as delimited and therefore also as
isolated domains. According to Wood, Carroll suc-
ceeds in differentiating the interactions between firm
and society, but he also neglects their interconnec-
tedness which would be required in reality. For
example, a decision to hire new employees can – at
the same time – make economical and ethical sense
(Freeman, 2004), and likewise a philanthropic
investment can also contribute to a firm’s economic
responsibility (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Therefore
and agreeing with Freeman (1994) and others (e.g.,
Agle et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2004; Schwartz,
1997; Werhane and Freeman, 1999; Wood, 1991),
we aim to overcome the artificial separation of
economic and social responsibilities to which the
CSR approach contributes.
Second, another argument raised by Freeman
(2004) against the CSR concept comes in the form
of a risk that business could treat its CSR activities as
moral substitutes to compensate for other irrespon-
sible activities. While we again agree with Freeman’s
perception that there is a danger of business using
CSR only as a public relations tool or, even worse,
as a moral substitute or add-on, we think that this
critique rather applies to its implementation in
business practice than to the concept itself. Corpo-
rate scandals exemplify this issue in flashing colors as
cases like Enron remind us.
Third, we argue that the general responsibilities
implied by the CSR approach can neither account
for the specificity of an individual firm nor for the
specific stakeholder network in which it is embed-
ded. For example, many responsibilities to employ-
ees do differ for a firm that is reducing its workforce
during a merger compared to a firm that is hiring in
a stage of growth.
Summing up, we think the CSR concept is
challenged by its usefulness as it (a) provides artificial
categories for evaluating corporate behavior and thus
contributes to a separation rather than to an inte-
gration of business and ethics, (b) includes the risk of
companies using CSR as a moral add-on, and (c)
does not sufficiently take into account the situations
with which managers are confronted. Therefore, we
propose that it is more interesting to look for what
and whom firms are responsible within a ‘‘creating
value for stakeholders approach’’ (Freeman, 2004,
p. 3).
The stakeholder view framework
Following the line of argument developed in the
previous section, we will now refer to the stake-
holder view framework (e.g., Abe and Shimizutani,
2005; Buono, 2003; Caldwell, 2004; Lamont, 2004;
Mattingly, 2004a, b; Post et al., 2002; Sachs and
Ru¨hli, 2004; Walsh, 2005). Apart from its com-
prehensiveness, we use the stakeholder view
framework mainly because of two reasons, namely
its focus on wealth creation and its normative core
that is compatible with sustainability.
The wealth creation focus
The stakeholder view emphasizes that the linkages
between the corporation and its multiple constitu-
encies are in many ways important vehicles for cre-
ating, sustaining, and enhancing the corporation’s
wealth-creating capacity. Organizational wealth
(Sveiby, 1997), therefore, is the goal and capacity of
an organization to create value in the long run. It is
enhanced whenever the desired output of the firm is
increased without any concurrent increase in the
amount of real resources used and/or risks generated,
or when resource used and/or risks are reduced
without any parallel decrease in the desired output
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Post et al., 2002; Sveiby,
1997). In its relationships with stakeholders, the
corporation may achieve these results directly – for
example when favorable customer relations increase
brand loyalty – or indirectly, when the general oper-
ating environment is improved through increased
trust among critical parties. Therefore, a firm is
‘‘an organization engaged in mobilizing resources
for productive uses in order to create wealth and
other benefits (…) for its multiple constituents, or
stakeholders’’ (Post et al., 2002, p. 17). Thereby,
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stakeholders are defined as ‘‘all individuals and
constituencies that contribute, either voluntarily or
involuntarily, to its wealth-creating capacity and
activities, and are therefore its potential beneficiaries
and/or risk bearers’’ (2002, p. 19). Based on this
definition, four categories of stakeholders are distin-
guished:
• benefit providers;
• benefit receivers;
• risk providers; and
• risk bearers.
This comprehensive stakeholder perspective not
only considers resource and market based stake-
holders but also social and political stakeholders
(Walsh, 2005). It is assumed that all the entities that
fit into one or more of the above-mentioned cate-
gories can contribute to strategizing concerning re-
source bases, industrial structure, and socio-political
concerns (see also Tables I and II for examples). It is
important that this wealth-creation process is not
only viewed in a one-sided fashion from the cor-
poration’s internal perspective (i.e., stakeholders as
benefit or risk providers) but also from the per-
spective of all stakeholders contributing (i.e., stake-
holders as benefit receivers or risk bearers). In the
stakeholder view the corporation is only legitimized
in its existence if it creates wealth for and with all its
strategic stakeholders (e.g., Sachs, 2004). This per-
spective is similar to a recent approach by Caldwell
and Phillips (2005), who for example argue in favor
of an increased responsibility toward suppliers be-
cause of the firm’s dependency on these and other
partners in its value-chain.
The normative core focus
The stakeholder framework’s normative core is
based on the idea of property rights as one of the
most important principles of our society (e.g.,
Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Asher et al., 2005;
Becker, 1978; Blair, 1995, 2005; Blair and Stout,
1999; Coase, 1960). The stakeholder view broadens
the idea of property rights not only to a financial but
also to all those that contribute (voluntarily or non-
voluntarily) to a firm-specific investment such as
knowledge or networks. For example, Blair and
Stout (1999, p. 261) claim to focus more on the
importance of intellectual capital: ‘‘Viewing the firm
as a bundle of assets owned by shareholders also
seems odd once we recognize that one of the key
TABLE I
Creation of wealth and stakeholder involvement in an economic foundation of the stakeholder view concerning the
principle of procedural justice
Stakeholder groups (examples) Contributions to wealth creation Stakeholder involvement regarding
strategic responsibility process
Resource-based view
Shareholders Capital expenditure, capital risk bearer Voting power at general assembly
Employees Benefits from human capital; firm-
specific investments
Forum for information and participa-
tion of employees (sounding board)
Industry structure view
Customers/users Risks of not being served anymore due
to corporate focusing
Round tables for product and service
innovations (lead users)
Suppliers Risks due to specific differentiation of
suppliers and resulting dependence on
firm
Involvement in product and service
development processes
Socio-political arena
Community Bearing risks due to pollution and
contamination
Involvement of representatives in stra-
tegic sustainability boards
Government Benefits by tax reductions due to
increasing location attractiveness
Development of new jobs
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assets a corporation uses in production is ‘intellectual
capital’ – that is, the knowledge and experience
residing in the minds of its employees, rather than
the hands of its shareholders’’. Consequently, Asher
et al. (2005, p. 3) argue that ‘‘a stakeholder per-
spective indicates that it is no longer tenable to
regard the shareholders as the only residual claim-
ants, where residual claimants are defined as persons
or collections whose relationships to the firm give
rise to a significant residual interest in the firm’s
success and failure’’. This has – in fact – important
implications for wealth creation and wealth distri-
bution processes as well as for corporate governance
and control by concluding that both shareholders as
well as other stakeholders are relevant. We think that
such a consideration of stakeholders as those indi-
viduals and groups that contribute to the firm’s
wealth-creation process can serve as a useful (nor-
mative) foundation for corporate responsibilities.
The corporation is only legitimized in its existence
and only fulfils its responsibilities if it creates wealth
for and with its stakeholders. These arguments imply
that corporate responsibilities should integrate both
the wealth creation and wealth dissemination part as
Phillips et al. (2003, p. 487) claimed as well:
‘‘Stakeholder Theory is concerned with who has
input in decision making as well as with who ben-
efits from the outcome of such decisions’’. This
relates to the consideration of procedural justice
(Freeman, 1984) and of distributive justice (Becker,
1992; Donaldson and Preston, 1995).
Procedural justice means integrating the values of
all important stakeholders into the development and
implementation of a firm’s strategy. ‘‘Not only
values must be taken into consideration when for-
mulating strategy, but if the strategy is to be
implemented the values of those affected by it must
also be factored into the equation’’ (Freeman, 1984,
p. 89). In the stakeholder view, the stakeholders are
integrated in the strategic processes by either pro-
viding or receiving benefits, or providing or bearing
risks. Table I might give some examples of what
procedural justice means for different stakeholder
groups. As already mentioned above, all stakeholders
might contribute to all three different strategic
contents (i.e., resource-based, industrial structure,
and socio-political).
Adopting the idea of distributive justice requires
criteria for determining which stakeholders get
which part of the outcome of the corporation’s
TABLE II
Creation and dissemination of wealth in an economic foundation of the stakeholder view concerning the principle of
distributive justice
Stakeholder groups (examples) Contributions to wealth creation Wealth dissemination
Resource-based view
Shareholders Capital expenditure, capital risk bearer Residual benefit; Shareholder value
Employees Benefits from human capital; firm-
specific investments
Education, employability, bonus
systems, motivation etc.
Industry structure view
Members of supply chain Contribution to network efficiency,
cooperation and performance
Procurement conditions, compensation
of supplier risk and knowledge contri-
bution
Joint venture-partner
and alliances
Complementing of resources, stabiliz-
ing of market position
Benefit and profit sharing, compensa-
tion for alliance risk
Socio-political arena
Community Bearing risks due to pollution and
contamination
Corporate philanthropy, financial and
non-financial compensations for risks
borne
Non-government
organizations (NGOs)
Information on emerging social risks Knowledge exchange, transparency;
considerations of other stakeholders’
expectations
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wealth-creation process (Donaldson and Preston,
1995). In the stakeholder view, the stakeholders
ought to participate in the value dissemination
according to their contributions to the benefits and
to their adoption of risk. Similar to the shareholders
who are compensated for the use of their capital and
the risk involved, all other relevant stakeholders
ought to be included in the value dissemination (cf.
Blair, 1995). After the expenditures (e.g., fixed sal-
aries for employees) have been compensated
according to the complete contracts, a residual profit
emerges from which – according to the distributive
justice principle – not only the shareholders but also
all other stakeholders should benefit. In reality, the
assessment of all these values is not necessarily pre-
determined as incomplete contracts do exist. Rather,
scopes of discretion exist as seen in determining the
compensation of shareholders. Thus, the dissemina-
tion of residual profits to all stakeholders is subject to
a scope of discretion. Therefore, the normative core
of corporate stakeholder responsibility considers
those who contribute voluntarily or involuntarily to
the firms’ wealth creation to thereby be legitimized
to earn a part of the residual benefit, and considers
involving stakeholders in the strategic processes.
Table II briefly illustrates different aspects of
wealth creation and dissemination in the stakeholder
view.
The presented normative core based on a broad
understanding of property rights matches central
ideas of the sustainability concept for the following
reasons. The classic definition for sustainable devel-
opment formulated by the World Commission on
Environment and Development Report, ‘Our
Common Future’, also known as the Brundtland
report is a ‘‘development that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs’’ (WCED,
1987, p. 43). If this definition that initially addressed
mainly the ecological dimension of sustainability is
enlarged by economic and social sustainability (e.g.,
Dentchev and Heene, 2004), then the idea of
property rights comes very close to such an idea of
sustainable development as integrating environ-
mental, economic, and social sustainability. The
important element that connects the two concepts of
stakeholder view and sustainability is the fact that
property rights exist not only between the firm and
stakeholders who contribute voluntarily but also
with those who contribute involuntarily such as local
communities or the natural environment in which
the firm operates.
Designing corporate stakeholder
responsibilities
In the following paragraphs, we will develop three
design principles that we think are appropriate for
defining corporate stakeholder responsibilities.
The principle of stakeholder specificity
A specific stakeholder status as either a benefit pro-
vider/receiver and/or as a risk provider/bearer
constitutes specific responsibilities for the firm.
Therefore, this stakeholder status or position implies
potentially different responsibilities for each stake-
holder and potentially for each type of stakeholder
relationship. Therefore, as not to intentionally
destroy but to create organizational wealth, respon-
sibilities to stakeholders should be designed so that
risks for all stakeholders – if possible – are reduced
and benefits are increased in accordance with their
specific states. This principle impacts the firm’s
strategy within its development as well as its
implementation, and corresponds to the procedural
justice to treat the firm’s strategic stakeholders in a
responsible manner.
The principle of fair wealth distribution
All stakeholders who make (voluntarily or not)
firm-specific investments either by providing ben-
efits or bearing risks should have the right of
residual claim analogously to the shareholders’ firm-
specific investment, and the right of residual claim
due to the fact of their risk bearing function. It
appears from our analysis that so as not to jeopar-
dize future contributions of stakeholders, the dis-
semination of organizational wealth should be fair
and reflect the fractions of each contributing
stakeholder to the firm’s wealth creation. This
principle considers financial as well as intellectual
contributions of stakeholders and corresponds to
distributive justice.
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The principle of situation and time specificity
Responsibilities should not only be stakeholder-
specific and designed to reflect the type of stake-
holder relationships, but they should also account
for the current situation the firm faces. Most firms
are facing changing or even turbulent environ-
ments, and as a consequence, a firm’s wealth-
creation process has to be continuously adapted.
We argue that exactly the same must apply to the
firm’s responsibilities. The reason for this require-
ment is because a change in the firm’s wealth-
creation process is often either triggered by or
results in changes in the firm’s stakeholder network.
This principle emphasizes the dynamics of corporate
stakeholder responsibility and corresponds to
procedural and distributive justice.
From principles to a dynamic framework
Together with the stakeholder view framework and
its normative core, we think that these three prin-
ciples offer building blocks for a generic and dy-
namic stakeholder responsibility framework, and
thereby represent a possible answer to Freeman’s
(2004, p. 3) initial question for what and whom a
firm is responsible ‘‘from a creating-value for
stakeholders approach’’. In Figure 1, we combined
the three principles on the one hand with the idea of
the stakeholder view of using the wealth-creation
process for determining a stakeholder’s status (this
corresponds to the ‘‘who’’ element in Figure 1). On
the other hand, the strategic content of corporate
stakeholder responsibilities is defined by applying the
constructs of procedural and distributive justice to
the different types of stakeholder relationships (this
corresponds to the ‘‘what’’ element in Figure 1).
And finally, the three design principles translate to
the question of ‘‘how’’ responsibilities should be
implemented.
It is important to note that we argue for dynamic
responsibilities toward stakeholders because these
responsibilities change when either the corporate
wealth-creation processes evolve and/or responsi-
bilities are implemented. Consequently, the arrows
in Figure 1 connect the three elements (who, what,
and how) to these dynamics.
Discussion and implications
Implications of the three principles for business practice
The first principle of stakeholder specificity implies
that there are no general responsibilities that apply to
every firm in the same manner (as suggested by the
CSR approach). Rather responsibilities toward stake-
holders depend on the characteristics of the firm’s
value creation process and on the ways a specific
stakeholder contributes to it. This implies determin-
ing stakeholder responsibilities and elaborating the
possibilities for stakeholder involvement in a strategic
process.
Concerning the second principle of fair wealth
distribution, we think that fulfilling this principle is
additionally essential in order to motivate stake-
holders in the long-run to participate in the firm’s
wealth-creation process. Firms that violate this
principle, for example by distributing most of the
wealth to only one or only a few stakeholder groups
(e.g., to the shareholders and/or management), may
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Risk providerRisk bearer
Benefit receiver
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Figure 1. Dynamic corporate stakeholder responsibili-
ties.
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tend to lose both legitimacy and willingness from
other stakeholders to participate. It seems important
to note that such benefits must not always appear in
the form of direct financial benefits, but they can
also take the form of lower prices for products and
services, innovative solutions, increased account-
ability and transparency, and education and knowl-
edge etc. The recommendation that stakeholder
responsibilities should be designed to reduce risks
and increase benefits may not always be possible to
achieve. While we acknowledge this, we propose
that a firm must at least compensate those stake-
holders whose risks are increased with an appropriate
amount of (increased) benefits. Likewise, if a firm
decreases the benefits for a specific stakeholder group
it should also reduce the risks borne by this group
(e.g., by transferring the risks to another group that is
able to carry the risks).
The third principle of situation and time speci-
ficity is necessary to transform our essentially static
concept of corporate stakeholder responsibilities into
a dynamic one. The dynamics are required in order
to adapt a firm’s responsibilities to changing envi-
ronments and to shifting stakeholder demands. This
emphasizes the firm’s task to monitor changes in its
stakeholder network and possible influences regard-
ing its responsibilities. Additionally, by including a
dynamic element with the second principle, we
forestall critics who might challenge the other two
principles for being too static.
We think that our approach to corporate stake-
holder responsibility bears several advantages for
business practice. First, it allows business to identify
to whom it should be responsible from a wealth-
creation perspective. Second, the principles we have
suggested may serve to design such responsibilities in
a comprehensive, dynamic, and sustainable manner.
And third, we think that implementing stakeholder
responsibilities in such ways can help business to
motivate stakeholders to cooperate. Cooperation
with stakeholders contributes to long-term success in
the marketplace.
Scientific implications
Regarding the scientific implications of our concept,
we have shown that adopting the stakeholder
view framework can help to produce firm-specific
answers to the question ‘‘what does a business stand
for?’’ and respectively ‘‘how should it treat its
stakeholders?’’ Hereby, we conclude that our cor-
porate stakeholder responsibility concept contributes
to closing the three gaps mentioned at the beginning
of the article. First, it better reflects the specific
responsibilities firms are confronted with in-business
practice, second it reduces the issue of responsibility
being treated as a moral add-on, and third, it sup-
ports the rejection of the separation thesis. Addi-
tionally, it has the advantage of not enforcing a
standard answer for all businesses and of being
dynamic rather than static.
Avenues of future research
The first principle (stakeholder specificity) further
challenges the integration of corporate stakeholder
responsibility in existing concepts of strategic man-
agement, as already claimed by Freeman (1984) and
recently claimed by the stakeholder theory of the firm
by Asher et al. (2005). This asks for how traditional
approaches to strategic management approaches must
be modified in order to address specific stakeholder-
firm constellations over time.
A problem of the second principle (fair wealth
distribution) is obviously how the stakeholders’
contributions can be measured in order to determine
the appropriate wealth distribution. This is a classical
team production problem (see Alchian et al., 1972;
Blair, 1995) of assigning a given output to multiple
team members in order to determine their contri-
butions. While we acknowledge that this is a
weakness of the second principle and that it is nei-
ther possible nor useful to determine the inputs of
each stakeholder in quantitatively exact numbers, we
think that qualitative judgements about benefits and
risks are still possible. As mentioned earlier, this is
already done by the managerial decisions concerning
the values given to the shareholders or in designing
compensation plans for managers or employees.
The third principle (time and situation specificity)
asks for an evolutionary theoretical foundation of the
corporate stakeholder responsibility in the sense that
the prior responsibilities may influence the devel-
opment of new responsibilities. See Sachs (2000)
for a detailed discussion of evolutionary concepts
applied to the responsibility of the corporation.
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All these principles should be evaluated by an
empirical investigation in a next step. Owing to their
comprehensiveness, we would propose to base it on
longitudinal comparative case study analysis (e.g.,
Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994).
Perceiving the limitations of our approach, we
think that the orientation toward a purely economic
normative foundation – even based on the enhanced
property rights approach – is also limited, particu-
larly if predominantly societal concerns influence
entrepreneurial operations. The discussion con-
cerning the bird flu virus might illustrate such cor-
porate stakeholder responsibility, as Roche is the
only producer of a possible medication in a case of a
pandemic. Thereby, the establishment of the truth
and its justification is paramount and not only eco-
nomic wealth creation (Maurer and Sachs, 2005;
Sachs et al., 2009). Consequently, a pluralistic ap-
proach would be needed as for example proposed by
Calton (2006). Such an approach would both sup-
port the compatibility of our concept with sustain-
ability research and the need of a cooperative means
of negotiating pluralistic cognitive frames in a multi-
stakeholder setting. This could help to solve the
problem that there must exist representative stake-
holders who stand for the natural environment in
order to achieve not only economic and social sus-
tainability but also ecological.
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